This is a reprint of a “From the Local History Room” column that first appeared in August 2013, before the launch of this weblog.
Dirksen’s ‘Long, Hard Furrow’
By Jared Olar
Library Assistant
During African-American History Month, it is an appropriate time to recall the crucial role that Pekin’s own Sen. Everett McKinley Dirksen played in the passage of the landmark Civil Rights of Act of 1964.
As a matter of fact, were it not for Dirksen, the efforts to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1964 would have foundered. Dirksen’s place in the story is spotlighted by Frank H. Mackaman of the Dirksen Congressional Center, in his 2006 book, “The Long, Hard Furrow – Everett Dirksen’s Part in the Civil Rights Act of 1964,” a copy of which is in the Pekin Public Library’s Local History Room collection.
The story Mackaman tells takes the reader behind the scenes in Washington, D.C., uncovering, or at times speculating about, the political stratagems and deal-making that brought about the bill’s passage. The bill was introduced by the administration of President John F. Kennedy on June 19, 1963, when the Kennedy administration sent the bill to the House of Representatives. Dubbed HR 7152, the bill had 11 sections or “titles,” conventionally designed by Roman numerals.
Even though the Democratic Party controlled the White House as well as both houses of Congress, the bill encountered opposition in Congress from segregationist, racist Democrats from the South. In addition, although the Republican Party had long supported civil rights for blacks in the face of Democrat opposition, many Republicans nevertheless objected to certain provisions of the bill on constitutional grounds.
Dirksen, who was the leader of the Republican Party in the Senate, himself was favorable to the bill in general. He had a solid record of support for civil rights legislation, but he expressed principled objections to some of the wording in Title II, on “Public Accommodations,” which prohibited places that are open to the general public from discriminating against anyone on the basis of race.
Mackaman explains Dirksen’s initial position on Title II in this way (p.22):
“Traditional Republican civil rights supporters argued that the provision should rest on the 14th amendment’s guarantee that blacks should not be denied equal protection of the laws by any state, rather than on Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce as the administration bill proposed. In June 1963, Dirksen sided with those who would support only a voluntary public accommodations provision. He opposed Title II.”
Because the Democrats were sharply divided on civil rights, the Kennedy administration and the Democratic Congressional leadership understood that the Civil Rights Act could not pass without solid bipartisan support. That meant the Democrats needed Republican support. The Republicans also were divided on this issue, but not as sharply as the Democrats. Because Dirksen was then the Senate minority leader, the White House and Congressional Democrats knew they needed Dirksen on their side.
The Washington Press corps also knew Dirksen’s support for the bill was crucial. As Mackaman says (p.26), “Doris Fleeson, writing for the [Washington] Evening Star in mid-July [1963], for example, opened her story on civil rights with these words: ‘The man to watch during Washington’s bruising civil rights battle is not President Kennedy, the Attorney General or the Negro leaders but effusive, ever-loving Dirksen.”
To ensure Dirksen’s support, the White House and Congressional Democrats pursued a two-pronged approach, using what they called an “Inside Strategy” and an “Outside Strategy.” The “Inside Strategy” consisted of efforts from Sen. Hubert Humphrey and other Democrats to woo Dirksen, while the “Outside Strategy” was made up of letter writing, advocacy from church leaders, marches and street protests and printed newspaper editorials. Mackaman observes that it’s not clear how effective either strategy was, and in particular Dirksen did not like pressure tactics of the sort deployed in the “Outside Strategy.”
In any case, at the time of Kennedy’s assassination on Nov. 22, 1963, the bill remained deadlocked. The day before Kennedy’s assassination, Dirksen had criticized Kennedy for inaction on the bill, and Mackaman concurs with Dirksen’s criticism, writing, “. . . Kennedy had been a reluctant warrior in the battle for civil rights . . . he chose not to make it a priority” (p.33). Kennedy’s focus was on foreign policy.
Things changed under President Lyndon Johnson, and the early months of 1964 saw a renewed bipartisan push to overcome the issues that had kept the bill bogged down in Congress. After a good deal of debate and negotiation, passages of the bill were amended to Dirksen’s satisfaction, and he threw his unreserved support behind it.
“[W]e dare not temporize with the issue which is before us,” Dirksen said in his speech calling for the Senate to end debate (“cloture”) and proceed to a vote. “It is essentially moral in character. It must be resolved. It will not go away.” Speaking of the struggle against racial discrimination, Dirksen said, “It has been a long, hard furrow and each generation must plow its share . . . The time has come for equality of opportunity in sharing of government, in education, and in employment. It must not be stayed or denied. It is here!”
Wholly apart from the momentous issue before the Senate, the vote for cloture was itself historic. As Mackaman writes, “Never in history has the Senate been able to muster enough votes to cut off a filibuster on a civil rights bill. And only once in the thirty-seven years since 1927 had it agreed to cloture for any measure.” Yet that is exactly what the Senate did. On June 10, 1964, the motion to end debate passed by a vote of 71-29, with 44 Democrats and 27 Republicans voting for cloture and 23 Democrats (20 of them from the South) and only six Republicans opposed.
Only minutes after the vote, Washington NAACP chief Clarence Mitchell told reporters, “It’s simply fantastic. [Dirksen] worked steadily and effectively for the bill. No one deserves more credit from our point of view.” Mitchell’s sentiments were echoed by many other members of the civil rights coalition.
The bill was then formally approved by the Senate on June 19, by a vote of 73-27. About two weeks later, the House of Representatives approved the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and President Johnson signed it into law on July 2.
And the rest, as they say, is history.
